Update (08/04/2014):

It looks like the Silverlight exploit is involved in creating the split from the single encoded stream:

processes

silverlight

Let's take a closer look at the Silverlight exploit:

XML file:

<Deployment xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/client/2007/deployment" xmlns:x="http://schemas.microsoft.com/winfx/2006/xaml" EntryPointAssembly="naqmjxbg270" EntryPointType="naqmjxbg270.App" RuntimeVersion="3.0.40818.0">
 <Deployment.Parts>
 <AssemblyPart x:Name="naqmjxbg270" Source="naqmjxbg270.dll" />
 </Deployment.Parts>
</Deployment>
Entry point:

load

Decompiled code:

decompiled

The suspicious code is circled in red. It shows a large array being placed in a buffer and loaded to memory.

If you'd like to share thoughts on this or have additional insights, please get in touch.

- - - -

A few days ago, we began noticing a strange new pattern with the Fiesta exploit kit. We were getting a double payload where before only one was delivered.

So we decided to check our archives and figure out exactly what happened during the last few days.

Before 07/26:

fiesta_before

You can see the landing page and the various exploits followed by a single malware drop (in red) whose parent process is java (this will be important for later).

On 07/26 around 10 AM PT (transition):

payloadsdissected

Notice how two payloads (in red) are dropped by the java process but that there are also an additional couple drops (in blue)  that don't seem to have a direct file size match.

The 'split'

Fiesta EK is delivering a double payload from a single URL call:

http://wybmku.hopto.org/q4vprom/71ee4a5dbf7401c554410e5e075a06500307565e0003055f0202015651580501;1

This is the encoded stream:

stream2

Once downloaded it is extracted and gives birth to two executables:

  •  File 1 (VT) detected as Spyware.Zbot.ED by Malwarebytes Anti-Malware.
  •  File 2 (VT) detected as Trojan.Agent.ED by Malwarebytes Anti-Malware.
If you add up both of the files' sizes you roughly get the size of the encoded stream:

sizematch

 

This trick is not exactly new. We documented the Redkit exploit kit back in April 2013 doing a similar thing.

Researchers interested in packet captures and referers, feel free to get in touch.

@jeromesegura

Image of Fiesta EK logo courtesy of FoxIT.