That “job brief” on Google Forms could infect your device

We’ve identified a campaign using business-related lures, such as job interviews, project briefs, and financial document, to distribute malware, including the PureHVNC Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

It’s not the malware that’s new, but how the attack starts.

Instead of the usual phishing email or fake download page, attackers are using Google Forms to kick off the infection chain. The attack typically begins when a victim downloads a business-themed ZIP file linked from a Google Form. Inside is a malicious file that sets off a multi-stage infection process, eventually installing malware on the system.

What is PureHVNC?

PureHVNC is a modular .NET RAT from the “Pure” malware family. In simple terms, it gives attackers remote control over an infected device and lets them steal sensitive information.

Once installed, it can:

Take control of the system and run commands remotely.
Collect information about the device, including operating system, hardware, security software, and info about the user and connected devices.
Steal data from browsers, extensions and crypto wallets.
Extract data from apps like Telegram and Foxmail.
Install additional plugins.
Achieve persistence in several ways (for example, via scheduled tasks).

Different lures, same goal: compromise your device

In our research, we found multiple Google Forms hosting links to malicious ZIP files that start the infection chain. These forms are convincing, impersonating real company names, logos and links. LinkedIn is one of the platforms used to send links to these malicious forms.

Fake Google Forms that distribute malicious ZIPs.
The attackers impersonate real companies
Well-known brands are impersonated to lend credibility

The forms typically ask for professional information (experience, background, etc.), making them feel like part of a real recruitment or business process.

Information requested from the user to make the form appear legitimate.
More information.

The forms link to ZIP files hosted on:

File-sharing services such as Dropbox, filedn.com, and fshare.vn
URL shorteners such as tr.ee and goo.su
Google redirect links that obscure the final destination

The ZIP archives use various names and are tied to different business-related themes (marketing, interviews, projects, job offers, budgets, partnerships, benefits) to avoid suspicion, for example:

{CompanyName}_GlobalLogistics_Ad_Strategy.zip
Project_Information_Summary_2026.zip
{CompanyName} Project 2026 Interview Materials.zip
{CompanyName}_Company_and_Job_Overview.pdf.rar
Collaboration Project with {CompanyName} Company 2026.zip

The lures use the names of well-known companies, particularly in the financial, logistic, technology, sustainability and energy sectors. Impersonating legitimate organizations add credibility to their campaign.

What happens after you download the file

The ZIP archives usually contain legitimate files (such as PDFs of job descriptions) and an executable file along with a DLL, typically named msimg32.dll. The DLL is executed via DLL hijacking (tricking a legitimate program into loading malicious code), although the technique has undergone multiple modifications and upgrades over time.

Legitimate PDFs are present in some ZIP files, like this one pretending to be a job description from a real company. — Legitimate PDFs are present in some ZIP files, like this one masquerading as a real job description.

Analysis of the malicious campaign

We identified multiple variants of this campaign, each using different methods to extract the archive, distinct Python code, and varying folder structures. Across these variants, the campaign typically includes an executable file along with a DLL hidden in a separate folder. In some cases, attackers also include legitimate files related to the lure’s theme, enhancing the overall credibility of the attack.

Example of files present in one of the archives analyzed.

The malicious code is present in the DLL, and carries out various operations, including:

Decrypting strings with a simple XOR, in this case with the “4B” key.
Detecting debugging and sandboxing with IsDebuggerPresent() and time64(), and displaying the error “This software has expired or debugger detected” if triggered.
Deleting itself, then dropping and launching a fake PDF.
Achieving persistence via the registry key CurrentVersion\Run\Miroupdate.
Extracting the “final.zip” archive and running it.

In this case, the PDF was started with the following command:

cmd.exe /c start "" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Marketing Director Assessment Project\Marketing_Director_Assessment_Project.pdf"

The PDF opened during the infection chain.

The archive final.zip is unzipped using different commands across the analyzed campaigns into a random folder under ProgramData. In this example, the tar command is used:

cmd.exe /c tar -xf "C:\ProgramData\{random folder}\{random folder \final.zip" -C "C:\ProgramData\{random folder \{random folder} " >nul 2>&1

The zip contains several files associated with Python and the next stage.

Python files compressed into a random folder in ProgramData.

Next, an obfuscated Python script called config.log is executed. It ultimately decodes and runs a Donut shellcode. This script appears under different names (e.g., image.mp3) and formats in the different chains analyzed.

"C:\ProgramData\{random folder}\{random folder}\pythonw.exe" "C:\ProgramData\{random folder}\{random folder}\config.log"

Obfuscated Python script that ultimately loads the Donut shellcode.

At the end of the infection chain, PureHVNC was injected into SearchUI.exe. The injected process may vary across the analyzed samples.

PureHVNC executes the following WMI queries to gather information about the compromised device:

SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct
SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity WHERE (PNPClass = 'Image' OR PNPClass = 'Camera')
SELECT Caption FROM Win32_OperatingSystem

For persistence, it creates a scheduled task using a base64-PowerShell command, with the flag “-RunLevel Highest” if the user has admin rights.

PowerShell command for the Scheduled Task

PureHVNC performs enumeration to exfiltrate information related to various browsers, extensions, and cryptocurrency wallets.

Methods related to wallet and browser data exfiltration.

The malware configuration is encoded with base64 and compressed with GZIP.

In this case, the configuration includes:

C2: 207.148.66.14
C2 ports: 56001, 56002, 56003
Campaign ID: Default
Sleeping Flag: 0
Persistence Path: APPDATA
Mutex Name: Rluukgz

How to stay safe

Using Google Forms is a highly effective method for distributing malware. Attackers are relying on trust in familiar tools like Google Forms, Dropbox, and LinkedIn, and impersonating legitimate companies to get past your guard.

If you deal with job offers, partnerships, or project work online, this is worth paying attention to:

Always check the origin of Google Forms, don’t enter sensitive information, and don’t download files unless you fully trust the source.
Verify requests through official company channels before engaging.
Be wary of links hidden behind URL shorteners or redirects.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

207.148.66.14

URL

https://goo[.]su/CmLknt7

https://www.fshare[.]vn/file/F57BN4BZPC8W

https://tr[.].ee/R9y0SK

https://dl.dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/52sgtk50j285hmde2ycry/Overview-of-the-MSI-Accounting-Project.rar?rlkey=9qmunvcp8oleeycld08gqwup9

HASH

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Pro tip: This is only a partial list of malicious URLs. Download the Malwarebytes Browser Guard plugin for full protection and to block the remaining malicious domains.

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